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Jo Cottenier and Henri
Houben
System crisis
According to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the current crash is only
comparable to that of 1929. At the time, the crash was followed by
several years of great depression: many businesses closed,
unemployment was incredibly high, salaries were cut, poverty rose.
This was the forewarning of the Second World War.
Will this crisis have
the same dramatic consequences? Or will it be contained? Suddenly,
states are back. Will that be enough to absorb the shock? Today,
even the staunchest of liberals are demanding more regulations for
financial markets. But is this crisis one that can be warded off
merely by keeping a better eye on the comings and goings of the
banking industry? Or is there more to it?
In order to find answers to
these questions we have to understand the origins of today's crisis. For
this, we need to go back in time.
Global economy, already in dire
straits in 1973
The United States
came out of the Second World War as the uncontested global
superpower. It had achieved this by making the dollar the
global currency. Only dollars could be exchanged for gold and
other currencies had a fixed exchange rate with the dollar. It was
the Bretton Woods agreement (1944) that established these
regulations.
The US used its upper
hand to counter communism. Its prodigality knew no bounds and the
dollar printing press was running full speed. In Western Europe,
the aim of the expensive Marshall Plan was to build a solid dam
against the Soviet Union and muzzle local resistance. The US
launched a similar help plan in South-East Asia (Korea and
Taiwan). The military machine set up to fight the Nazis was
perfected and used to fight off communism. The US led wars against
the "communist threat" in Korea (1950-1953) and in
Vietnam (1959-1975). It also offered its support to its Zionist
allies in the Middle-East during the Six-Day War (1967) and the
Yom Kippur War (1973).
The US economy at the
time of the Cold War stimulated rapid growth but was also a source
of instability. Industrial productivity grew rapidly during the
golden sixties. Work and capital were stable. In other words,
salaries were increasing as fast as productivity. The distribution
of National income (in percentage of work and capital) remained
stable. However, all that didn't take place smoothly.
The end of the 60s
sounded the death knell of this long period of relatively
important and stable growth. The rapid growth of productivity
slowed down, production capacity was no longer fully taken
advantage of. Investments weren't completely used, profit rates
decreased. Markets finally saturated; it was clear that an
overproduction crisis was brewing. It all boiled over when, in
1973, the OPEC nations quadrupled oil prices. Prices rose from 2
to 9 dollars a barrel. The second oil crisis occurred in 1979 when
prices went from 13 to 26 dollars and by 1982 a barrel cost 32
dollars.
Two views exist on
the crisis that started in 1973. Was it a result of oil prices, in
other words of an external factor forced on us by oil producers?
Or was the oil crisis merely the starting point? According to this
second view, global economy growth was already in dire straits in
1973 because of recurrent internal capitalist processes. The very
processes Karl Marx had described a century earlier.
Karl Marx enabled us
to understand the recurrent processes of capitalism. He clearly
explained why these processes inevitably lead to overproduction
crises. There is indeed a fundamental contradiction at the basis
of capitalism: means of production (factories, raw materials…)
are privately owned whereas production itself takes place
following an ever more social mode. It is a thousand times more
true today than in Marx's time. Complex production
apparatus[Owner1]
, often deployed all over the world, are working to bring profit
only to a few shareholders. The only planning is aimed at bringing
down competition. To do this, one has to make higher profits than
the competition and accumulate more and more capital. By
increasing the rate of investment, each party hopes to win market
shares over its rivals. But, to be able to achieve this,
production costs (cut salaries) need to be reduced and
continuously rationalized in order to produce more using less
labor. This process inevitably leads to overproduction crises
because of the contradiction between production capacity and the
people's decreasing purchasing power.
This is how Marx
summed it up: "The ultimate reason for all real crises always
remains the poverty and restricted consumption of the masses as
opposed to the drive of capitalist production to develop the
productive forces as though only the absolute consuming power of
society constituted their limit."[1]
This is the result of social
chaos, where only the law of maximum profit rules. Production is in no
way organized to satisfy the needs of society at large.
A very long slow-motion
overproduction crisis
Every time there is a
relapse, the capitalists push their own solutions and know they
can count on the support and help of the state. The usual cure to
the crisis involves the destruction of part of the production
capacity by shutting down businesses and laying off workers.
Prices are cut as are salaries. Smaller, weaker companies vanish
or are taken over by larger ones. This allows for supply once
again to be adapted to demand. The profit rate rises again, money
is invested again: a new cycle may begin. As Marx described it,
this is a process of growth followed by standstill, crisis and
recovery occurring over a period of five to seven years: the
economic cycle.
However, this time,
there is more than just a "simple" cyclical recession.
Since 1973, there have been upturns and downturns but the peaks
are short lived and the downturns steep. A period of crisis this
long has already occurred previously. The first severe crisis that
affected the great economic powers was after 1873. It ended with
the mass export of capital and a clash for a share of the colonies
which, in the end, led to the First World War. It was the initial
stage of what Lenin called "imperialism": an –ultimate-
stage of capitalism characterized by the fusion of bank and
industrial capital and the division of the whole world into
colonies.
The second structural
crisis took place after the crash of 1929 and ended in the
outbreak of the Second World War. Since 1973, we have been living
in the third structural crisis. However, this crisis is taking
place under special circumstances.
As early as 1975,
stabilization schemes were already being put into practice in
Belgium. Four "national industries" –coal, steel,
textile and glass- were dismantled with the cooperation of the
State, including the temporary nationalization of the steel
industry. A second wave of schemes was launched in 1981 when plans
were made for cuts in salaries and social services. The Belgian
Franc suffered a devaluation and three wage increases following
rises in the price index were not carried out. Governments
dismantled social security and unemployment benefits regardless of
national strikes and demonstrations firmly opposing it. Only in
1989 were we able to witness a slight upturn which had already
ended by 1991.
The European
Community took things in hand from 1985 onwards. Many measures
were undertaken: the common market in 1990, the Maastricht treaty
in 1991 (and common currency), liberalization of the public sector
during the 90s and the Lisbon Strategy of 2000. In Belgium, the
opposition to these measures was mainly expressed through a large
wave of strikes against the "global plan" in 1993 and
the strikes against the so-called "generation pact" in
2005.
The US competitor was the model
for all the measures put forward by the European Union. This is no coincidence.
Since the beginning of the crisis, in 1973, the US superpower has never
stopped leaving its heavy hallmark on the global economy. This became
even clearer in 1980 when the most right wing and aggressive part of the
US bourgeoisie gained power under the Reagan presidency. This led to radical
measures that were to exert much influence on the development of the crisis
all around the world. Because of some of these measures, the crisis was
passed on to other countries. Others temporarily slowed the crisis and
artificially boosted the global economy. This explains why this particular
crisis has been so complex. The solutions the US offered back then have
contributed to today's financial collapse. A recap of these solutions
will enable us to understand better how serious the crisis really is and
why the only way out of this delayed overproduction crisis is through
the massive destruction of capital.
Following the US example only
leads us to collapse
At the end of the 60s
America had to deal with two rivals that had come back to life:
Europe and Japan. At that same time, America got tangled in the
war against the independence of Vietnam and other countries in the
region of South-East Asia. The arms race with the Soviet Union was
also quite expensive. The dollar tap was kept running and vast
amounts of dollars landed in European banks (so-called
Eurodollars). At the start of Bretton Woods in 1944, the Fed still
owned 60% of the world's gold reserves. But now that European
national banks were converting these vast amounts of dollars into
gold –a sort of second Gold rush -, that share quickly fell
to just 15%. So Nixon took the unilateral decision to stop the
direct convertibility of dollars into gold. Two years later fixed
exchange rates were also abandoned and the dollar started to
float. It lost value until 1979. Then, the Volcker-Reagan duo
began to follow a different path.
Letting go of Bretton
Woods gave the US more room to maneuver because the dollar could
no longer be devaluated by re-claiming its value in gold from the
federal gold reserve. More than ever the dollar became a global
currency, only now, the US government could also manipulate the
exchange rate at will. Until today, it has more than taken
advantage of this possibility.
For thirty years the
United States revived financial markets all over the world. It
used a three-way mechanism as a lever: dollar, credit and
speculation which led to a huge increase in the size of financial
markets. In 1980, the value of financial instruments was estimated
to be equivalent to the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In
1993, that value was twice as high. And, by the end of 2005, it
was more than three times higher i.e. 316% of world GDP. Between
2000 and 2004, government and private debt securities accounted
for over half of this increase. This shows the growing role of
debt and leveraged buyouts[2]
as the motor of this process[3].
In 2004, daily trade
of derivatives[4]
totaled 5.7 billion dollars and trade of currency 1.9 billion
dollars. Together amounting to 7.6 billion dollars daily. That's
more than the value of annual exports[5].
How did this trend appear?
To keep its preeminent position, the United States chose paths during
the 80s that all contributed to pump up the financial bubble.
1.
In 1979, Paul
Volcker, the Fed's chairman, suddenly decided to raise interest
levels. In a few months they rose from 11% to 22%. That's
unbelievably high, especially with the slump still very much
present! The fact that credit was still incredibly expensive
continued to slow down the economy. An inflation rate of 10% meant
that capitalists were losing 10% of their fortune annually. High
inflation is good for people who are in debt because they're
paying back the money they owe with low-value money. Banks however
see the credit loans they have granted lose 10% of their value.
Reagan and Volcker quickly made up their minds[6].
This decision was
also conditioned by the fact that the debt previous to high
inflation could be attributed to high salaries and "excessive"
social benefits. In short, capital holders wanted the fight
against inflation to take precedence and they won their case.
[Owner2]
As a result, inflation decreased down to 2 or 3% at the end of the
80s. It was the first big gift to the US financial world.
The consequences
quickly caught up. The crisis worsened and reached a peak. The
biggest victims were those heavily in debt who could do nothing
but watch as interest rates rose sharply. It was a disaster for
Latin-American countries.
Western banks had
granted loans to third world countries who were all too happy to
see capital being injected to help build their industries. The US
was particularly well-off: 40% of all loans were made by their
banks and US industry received many orders to provide equipment
for their industrialization which was often just starting up. All
seemed rosy until interest rates flew out of proportion and
countries which had borrowed money had to pay off more interest
than what they were earning from their exports. In 1982, Mexico
was on the verge of bankruptcy. In 1983 it was Argentina's turn
and Brazil followed in 1984. Naturally the banking industry was
also in big trouble but, at the same time this was once again an
opportunity for America, via the IMF, to push for radical
restructuring schemes which would open Third World economies to US
multinationals. In the name of the free-market all national
protection barriers were torn down to the advantage of
transnational companies.
Volcker's decision to raise
interest rates made the dollar more appealing. The dollar's exchange rate
stopped falling and high interest rates helped to attract investors. The
way was now clear for the two remaining elements: credit and speculation.
2.
Capital holders
demanded also a fiscal reform. Reagan gave them the Economy
Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The tax rate on the highest slice of
incomes was reduced during the 80s and 90s from 70% to 28% partly
under Reagan, and partly under Clinton. As the income of America's
wealthiest (1% of citizens) increased by 50% during that time, the
average tax rate on their income fell from 37% in 1979 to 29% in
1990. This meant a 70% raise after tax income. For America's
poorest (20% of citizens) however, income and fiscal pressure
remained the same. In 1980 that same 1% of wealthiest US citizens
owned 30% of all assets, a share that rapidly reached 38% during
the 80s[7].
In 1998, the richest 5% of US citizens owned 59% of wealth i.e.
more than the remaining 95% of US citizens.
The consumption of
the well-off underwent a double incentive. Firstly, because they
had more income, and secondly, because the increase of their
assets provided hedging if they wished to take out loans. The
share of private consumption in GDP[8]
increased from 62% in 1980 to 68% in 2000.
This was reflected by
the savings of US families. 50% of US families with low incomes
always barely had enough to set money aside, but regardless of
this fact, annual savings made by all families fell from 8% of GDP
in 1980 to 5% in 1990 and 1.5% in 2000. Private debt increased and
was further encouraged. In 1980 the debts of US families accounted
for about 50% of GDP and increased to 65% in 1990, 75% in 2000 and
100% in 2007. The second element had been put in place.
This giant credit
rise was not without consequence for the global economy. US
consumption, which accounts for an average of 30% of private
global consumption, promoted global demand. Indeed, since the 60s,
US multinational companies have increasingly been producing
abroad: in Europe and in cheap labor countries. Consumption was
increasing which meant imports were also on the rise. America soon
had to deal with a growing trade deficit.
The dollar's increasing exchange
rate (because of high interest rates) had a double effect. On one hand
a strong dollar enabled people to buy better value foreign goods and on
the other hand it also attracted foreign investors. So the dollars that
left the country when paying for the goods were then reinvested as capital
in US government bonds and in US banks. The dollar guaranteed that the
overconsumption of the wealthy would be perpetuated. In other words, the
US economy was being supported by the outside world.
3.
A crucial evolution
in company life occurred at the same time. Companies were working
more and more for the stock exchange. It was Jack Welch who set
the tone. In 1981, Jack Welch was head of General Electric which
had a work force of 400,000. His ambition was to turn General
Electric into the most competitive company in the world and he had
his own methods to reach that goal. Step one? Lay off 10% of least
efficient workers every year. Step two? On top of industrial
activity, introduce the company to the financial world. This is
what Welch did with General Electric. The group's revenue soared
from 1.5 billion dollars in 1980 to 4 billion in 1990 and 7.3
billion in 2000. Shareholders were jubilant.
Welch's method was so
successful that it soon became the norm in the US and even the
whole Western industrial world. Earnings yields were set in
advance, generally around 15% which was much higher than the
average profit rate. And that profit margin was already being
calculated in advance in production costs. Profit deduction was
made in advance, not after. This led companies to cut corners
constantly wherever possible and take many financial risks. They
rushed into the financial world, worked mainly with borrowed cash
and relied on financial leverage[9].
Share returns had
become the ultimate criteria; a company's stock valuation became
the only way to measure its worth. The higher the market value,
the more investors were attracted. This is how the third element
came to life.
US industry started
to focus primarily on high-tech products and on central activities
per branch, i.e. the most profitable sectors. Secondary activity
was subcontracted and often moved to countries where labor was
cheap. This is how Mexican maquiladoras continued to
develop. From 620 in 1980 (with 120,000 workers), they increased
in 2006 to 2,800 and they employed 1.2 million people. A similar
development took place in countries like Malaysia, Singapore and
Taiwan.
The same methods were used
all over the world. Currently, many monopolies use the 15% rule to satisfy
their shareholders and many European and Japanese monopolies earn more
from their financial operations than their actual industrial production.
4.
Financial
deregulation and unbridled proliferation hasten today's financial
collapse.
The United States
took several measures after the crash of 1929 and after several
banks went bankrupt to try and stop these events from happening
again. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 introduced the separation of
bank types according to their business (commercial and investment
banking), and it founded the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
for insuring bank deposits. It also implemented what was known as
Regulation Q which aimed at prohibiting a differentiation in
interest rates according to the size of the client's wealth.
Without this regulation, banks would attract wealthier clients by
offering them higher interest rates which would put ordinary banks
in danger.
However, in the early
60s, these legal restrictions were gradually being dismantled and
by 1980 they were completely repealed. An ever growing market of
derivatives (financial securities of which the value is determined
by other assets) saw the light of day. This led to surprising
constructions. Bonds were created with any hedge, even debt. A
real revolution in the financing of investment and takeover was
instigated. Companies no longer relied on bank loans but could
finance operations by issuing financial securities. Some even
specialized in issuing these securities. When Clinton came to
power the differentiation of financial institutions was revoked.
Total deregulation occurred. Other countries followed the US
example.
Financial instruments
proliferated and became in turn objects of speculation. They grew
to such an extent that the traditional relation between bank and
industry ended up assuming entirely different forms. In his work
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin shows
how the merger of bank monopolies and industrial monopolies
creates what was then called finance capital. He explains that
property and interest are linked because, with credit, banks
gradually become owners of the industry. Lenin concludes: "The
concentration of production; the monopolies arising there from,
the merging or coalescence of the banks with industry—such
is the history of the rise of finance capital and such is the
content of that concept.[10]"
The hold of the financial world over industry and their
intertwinement is not lessened. But big merchant banks founded
financial institutions with much more flexible structures and
which, preferably, resort to new financial instruments. They are
capable of coming up with larger sums of money for takeovers and
preferably work on international markets, whereas, generally,
banks have strong ties to national markets.
The share of the
regular market that banks and insurance brokers held in US
financial assets halved between 1980 and 2007, decreasing from 70%
to 35%. The share of private equity funds, pension funds, hedge
funds, etc. increased in the same proportions. Hedge funds have
been undergoing a bustling growth since 1990; they make very
aggressive investments and account for 40% of all stock exchange
transactions. In 2007, 11,000 hedge funds were handling 2,200
billion dollars. For many, hedge funds represent the next black
hole and they think they may lead to a new financial cataclysm.
Today, a few giant
private funds like KKR, Blackstone, Carlyle and Cerberus control
the international financial market meaning they also control many
company shares. Banks are given a new role: granting loans to
these specialized funds.
Therefore Lenin's definition
of finance capital is still very much up to date. Lenin also talked about
the growing separation between production control and the layer of parasites
known as "coupon cutters". His book was written in 1916, almost
a century ago, but it could have been written today: "It is characteristic
of capitalism in general that the ownership of capital is separated from
the application of capital to production, that money capital is separated
from industrial or productive capital, and that the rentier who lives
entirely on income obtained from money capital, is separated from the
entrepreneur and from all who are directly concerned in the management
of capital. Imperialism, or the domination of finance capital, is that
highest stage of capitalism in which this separation reaches vast proportions.
The supremacy of finance capital over all other forms of capital means
the predominance of the rentier and of the financial oligarchy; it means
that a small number of financially “powerful” states stand
out among all the rest.[11]"
The European Union wants to catch
up with the United States
In the Lisbon
Strategy (2000), the EU set the goal of catching up with the US
economy by 2010. But this ambition has gone even further. Because
the crisis has been raging since 1973, European bourgeoisie was
incited to breathe new life into the unification of Europe,
particularly because of the aggressive response of the US to this
crisis.
During the first
years of the crisis, the intervention of the European authorities
was limited to restructuring the steel industry and other
threatened industries. But the European Union wanted to catch up
with the United States. In 1983, the administrators of 17
important European monopolies had a round table of European
industrialists. This European round table would draw up the
program of the Single European Act of 1985 and finish the project
of 1990 for a single European market. The project was launched by
an enthusiastic Jacques Delors and his European Commission. Things
sped up in 1991 with the Maastricht Treaty which established a
single European currency and a common European foreign policy. The
Lisbon strategy (2000) clearly stated the great objective "to
make the EU the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based
economy in the world."
In many fields, the
US approach was adopted: fiscal reforms, workload extension,
privatization of social security, total free market, stock
exchange expansion. The competitive advantages of weak social
protection sent European countries down the path of the
dismantlement of historical gains such as social security. The gap
between the wealthy and the poor widened rapidly also in Europe.
From the early 90s on, the EU led the liberalization of
telecommunications, railway and postal services. Public services
which, in Europe are much more important in everyday lives than in
the US, were dismantled and transferred to private capital. The
Bologna reform meant that European education would copy the US
model which is much more aimed at fulfilling the needs and
interests of the industry. The collapse of the socialist countries
in 1989 gave even more strength to the liberal offensive. Fear of
communism had disappeared, capitalism triumphed.
However, European capitalists
were confronted with a bigger opposition to the dismantlement plans. Even
though trade unions were not organized at the European level yet, plans
were still slowed one country at a time as a result of national rallying.
Bubble economy cannot sweep the
crisis
In short: the fact
that US consumption has been greatly stimulated since 1973 did not
resolve the crisis. On the contrary, it helped prolong it. After
1973, growth would never again reach the level it did during the
60s. Like a Damocles' sword, the overproduction crisis would never
cease to threaten global economy.
When overproduction
occurs, a capital surplus follows. An excess that cannot be used
to increase production because it collides with market limits.
This capital excess is searching for high returns and this is
where the financial sector lends a helping hand. The conditions to
enable this were created by financial deregulation and the
increase in the number of new financial instruments. The whole
thing was heightened even further by excessive credit stimulus
because granting credit is a way of creating money out of nothing.
A big step towards
financial proliferation is made when debt is used as a hedge to
issue securities or financial derivatives – which is called
securitization. In this way, any debt can be converted into a
security which means it can continue to be bought and sold and as
a consequence turns into an object of speculation. From there on,
any pole of economic growth can become the cornerstone of
financial bubbles. Money is lent to expansion poles in the economy
and this debt is negotiated in the form of financial securities.
Growth poles also make the Stock Exchange go up and, as a result,
financial institutions and speculators have a free hand. This is
how outrageous financial bubbles that attract investors and
speculators are born. Fictive capital which relies solely on the
hope of never ending growth appears. Sooner or later, these
bubbles inevitably disintegrate.
It was already the
case with the Third World debt at the end of the 70s which, as a
result, led to the collapse of Latin American countries in
1982-1984 that we mentioned earlier. History repeated itself in
1997 with a giant financial bubble in Asian markets. The
devaluation of Thai currency caused the crash. Side effects were
even felt in Russia and Brazil. Hedge funds then turned to
high-tech companies located in Silicon Valley. That bubble also
disintegrated with the Nasdaq crash of 2000. And this is where the
story of the mortgage bubble begins.
Following the Nasdaq
crash and 9/11,[Owner3]
the Fed cut its prime rate[12]
to 1% in an attempt to impede the threatening recession. Mortgage
banks aggressively took advantage of low rates to issue loans to
buy houses. They offered extremely favorable conditions without
much of a guarantee. The real market was in full expansion and
everybody thought prices would continue to rise, meaning the
solvency[13]
of borrowers was not an issue: their houses could be seized and
money as well. Insolvent citizens were allowed to take out loans
under special conditions. This is what became known as subprime
loans. The mortgage market soared and the poorest layers of the
population jumped at the opportunity. The number of subprime loans
increased from 8% (in 2001) to 20% (in 2007) of the total amount
of mortgage loans in the US.
Financial market
deregulation did the rest. Mortgage banks sold their subprime
loans (along with their risks) on to specialized companies[14]
which released securities on the market hedged by these mortgages.
As a result, mortgage banks could continue to give out loans.
Between 2001 and 2006 the machine kept running and US mortgages
totaled 11,500 billion dollars. These securities were scattered
all over the world in banks, pension funds, merchant banks,
speculation funds and hedge funds, which were particularly fond of
them.
When the Fed
progressively brought the interest rate up to 5,25% many new
buyers were left without a penny. A huge amount of foreclosures
took place and the real estate market turned. The number of
default payers increased with each quarter and by the end of 2006,
the first banks and hedge funds were in trouble.
The avalanche could
no longer be stopped and in September 2008, the banking crisis
reached its peak.
Consequences were
even more devastating for house owners. Over two million of them
lost the house they had just bought and were left out on the
streets.
However, the crisis has long
since not been solely US. The world over, over 1 000 billion dollars worth
of junk bonds have been debited and, one after the other, banks are declaring
losses. The situation worsens when, as a precaution, banks drain the interbank
market because general mistrust grows. This mistrust catches on to the
public and the threat of a "bank rush" lingers.
It is not over yet
How is it that the
disintegration of the mortgage bubble has hit much harder than
that of the previous bubble and that the whole financial system
finds itself on the brink of the abyss? This is the biggest
financial bubble in history and it has contaminated the whole
system with its junk bonds. All the measures for protection and
government control have been taken apart in such a way that no one
is able to check the true value of mortgage-backed securities or
what their location is. This made a chain reaction inevitable.
The seriousness of
our current situation can be observed by the panic that led almost
every national State to come to the swift rescue of their banks
and by the extent of their interventions. In order to measure this
extent, it is useful to know that the seven years of war in Iraq
and Afghanistan have cost 750 billion dollars. That's only a
little more than Paulson's 700 billion dollar plan for the US
government to purchase the banks’ bad debt. But that's not
all. To rescue banks such as Bear Stearns and to nationalize
financial institutions such as Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac and AIG,
another couple of hundred billion dollars were spent. By adding up
these various interventions, our total nears the 1,800 billion
dollar mark. Let's point out the fact that GDP for the whole
African continent in 2007 was 2,150 billion dollars. It is obvious
that a hole this big will have dire consequences for the State's
debt, budget, and finally, the US citizen's tax return. It is
estimated that the latter will have to shell out at least 2,000
dollars.
Will Fed Chairman Ben
Shalom [4]
Bernanke be able to find a new sector to blow another bubble into
and bring some relief? It is completely improbable. US consumption
has collapsed and many investors have lost large amounts of money
on the Stock Exchange. Financial instruments and real estate have
lost a lot of value and cannot be used to hedge new credit. The
kind of credit that, for understandable reasons, the banking
industry has become rather reluctant to grant. Cutting interest
rates to boost the economy is not an option either because at 3%,
they are already at their lowest.
It is clear that the only way
out of this constantly delayed overproduction crisis is by annihilating
production capacity. This means the worst is yet to come. The crisis promises
to be long and deep. Third world countries will be the first to see their
exportations decrease, they will provide less raw materials and will soon
find themselves once again under the iron rule of the IMF and its restructuration
plans.
Is this the end of the US'
hegemony?
For many years, the
US has managed to sail its economic ship by passing the effects of
the crisis on to other countries. The way the US artificially
blows up the economy also affects the rest of the world. The US
was able to take liberties because of its position as leading
economic power. It seems, on this level, that things are changing.
The near-collapse of big US banks and the disarticulation of the
global financial system will inevitably continue to drain the US
economy as well as US authority.
America's financial
difficulties go hand in hand with the War on Terror as it
flounders and even reaches a dead end in both Afghanistan and
Iraq. The political authority of the United States inside
international institutions and on the diplomatic front is
increasingly being disputed. Global order is taking a new turn and
a more multipolar world is forming.
The US still holds
the world's strongest economy. But, over the past few decades, the
economy has been artificially inflated in order for it to continue
to embody the motor of the global situation and for that, the US
is now paying a heavy toll: its current account is showing an
extremely high deficit which is mainly attributable to its trade
imbalance. As a result, dollars are being scattered all over the
world and return to the US as investments or capital. This will
only be able to continue as long as the dollar stays the currency
of trade and international reserves. However, the financial
sector's collapse will sooner or later put an end to this
exceptional position.
The astronomical sums
that the US government injects into its banking industry will only
increase public debt, which already is colossal because of the
expenses of war. Less and less countries will be inclined to
invest their reserves unconditionally in the United States and
give their support in this way to the dollar as the international
reserve currency . Sooner or later the end of the dollar empire
will come.
A role is appearing
for China. As the main rising power, this country already has an
important influence on global economy because of the increasing
surplus of its balance of trade and its considerable financial
reserves. America's deficit stands at 800 billion dollars every
year. According to Zhu Min, the vice-president of China's bank,
the United States won't be able to rely on China anymore to place
the necessary state bonds in order to finance the rescue of US
banks.
How will the US empire react?
By increasing even more its expenses on war and by pursuing its military
adventures? At the moment, it remains an open question, but it is a historical
fact that only the massive destruction of production capacity through
war was able to find a way out of the last significant system crisis,
that of the 1930s.
A system crisis has to be
solved by replacing the system itself
The dyke ended up by
giving way. After the financial collapse, after the crash of the
giant bubble, a whole floor of the overproduction crisis is
landing on our heads. Resembling a long lasting depression rather
than a slight slack period. Not even the vast amounts of cash
involved will be able to keep this tidal wave under control.
As for the causes,
fingers are pointed in all directions: it's because of subprimes,
because of hedge funds, because of the US…
According to Karel
Van Miert, former leader of the SP.a (Flemish socialist party),
former European commissioner and Philips administrator, it is the
bankers' race for profit which is to blame for the collapse. Are
they too greedy? Anything goes to hide the fact that behind this
race for profit – led not only by bankers but also by
companies such as Philips – there lies a constant, a
recurrent phenomenon. Karl Marx discovered this phenomenon over
150 years ago. His conclusion was that capitalism could not exist
without crises.
When it comes to
solutions, consensus is considerable, from social-democrats to
liberals: there is a need for more transparency, more regulation
and more control.
No, it is not about
the greed of a handful of people anymore. No, it is not about the
race for profit of a couple of bankers. No, it is not about taking
apart financial regulations as many claim. No, the situation will
not be resolved by implementing "genuine free market, the one
that obeys rules". The crisis is inherent in the system
itself.
Never before has humanity produced
as much prosperity, but nor has it ever produced so much poverty. It is
each and everyone's labor – and labor only – which produces
prosperity, not capital. It is but elementary logic to demand that collectively
produced prosperity be used to improve the living conditions of all human
beings. This is impossible in a capitalist economy which functions according
to the interests of a tiny minority and inevitably leads to crisis. This
is why all the significant means of production should be placed in the
hands of the collectivity.
18 November 2008
Jo Cottenier
is the author of La Société Générale
1822 – 1992 (with Patrick De Boosere and Thomas Gounet)
EPO, 1989 and of Le temps travaille pour nous (Time is on
our side) (with Kris Hertogen) EPO, 1991. He is a member of the
Bureau of the Workers' Party of Belgium
Henri Houben,
doctor of economics, is a researcher at the Institute of Marxist
Studies, specialized in the study of multinationals, European
employment strategy and the economic crisis. He is currently
working on a book on the economic crisis which is due to come out
in spring 2009.
Translated from
French by Sarah Kamer
From Études
Marxistes, n°84, October-December 2008
http://www.marx.be/FR/em_index.htm
From International
Communist Review, Issue 1, December 2009
http://www.iccr.gr/
(available in Dutch,
Russian, Spanish and Greek translations)
[1]
Capital, Volume III, Chapter 30.
[2]
A leveraged buyout occurs when a financial sponsor acquires a
controlling interest in a company's ownership equity and where a
significant percentage of the purchase price is financed through
leverage (borrowing). The assets of the acquired company are used
as collateral for the borrowed capital, sometimes with assets of
the acquiring company. The bonds or other paper issued for
leveraged buyouts are commonly considered not to be investment
grade because of the significant risks involved.
[3]
McKinsey Global Institute, 2006.
[4]
Derivatives are financial contracts, or financial instruments,
whose values are derived from the value of something else (known
as the underlying). The underlying on which a derivative is based
can be an asset (e.g., commodities, equities (stocks), residential
mortgages, commercial real estate, loans, bonds), an index (e.g.,
interest rates, exchange rates, stock market indices, consumer
price index (CPI) — see inflation derivatives), or other
items (e.g., weather conditions, or other derivatives). Credit
derivatives are based on loans, bonds or other forms of credit.
The main types of derivatives are forwards, futures, options, and
swaps.
[5]
Chandrasekhar, July 12 2007
[6]
Reagan's politics were inspired by monetarists such as Milton
Friedman for whom monetary orthodoxy is the most precious good.
[7]
It then remained stable all through the 90s. This is an estimation
made by Henri Houben on the basis of Edward Wolff's The
Increasing Inequality of Wealth in America. In Belgium, that
1% is estimated at 25% of all private fortunes.
[8]
GDP (gross domestic product) is the total value of all final goods
and services produced in a particular economy over a year.
[9]
Financial leverage takes the form of a loan (debt), the proceeds
of which are (re)invested with the intent to earn a greater rate
of return than the cost of interest.
[10]
Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism
[11]
Lenin, op. cit.
[12]
Prime rate is a reference interest rate used by banks. The term
originally indicated the rate of interest at which banks lent to
favored customers.
[13]
Solvency is the ability of an entity to pay its debts.
[14]
They are called SPVs (Special purpose vehicles)
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